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GERMAN VERSUS ENGLISH AGGRESSION 
The present state of public opinion is qnite inexplicable 
unless we remember that great wars are periods of the abnormal, 
not only in the political, the industrial, and the commercial, 
but in the intellectual sphere as well. The mental chaos that 
confronts us on every hand can be accounted for only on the 
theory that wars are days of sickness in the life of the human race. 
The bold assertions, wild speculations, fanciful prophecies which 
one hears on every hand must be regarded as the incoherent 
prattle of a delirious public mind. Not only the unthinking 
public but men of learning have thrown cold reasoning to the 
winds and are swayed by feeling and passion. The scholar vies 
with the man of the street in seizing upon vague and conflicting 
newspaper reports to bolster up his whims and prejudices. Facts 
are ignored and principles of thought which were formerly deemed 
fundamental are now utterly disregarded. Personal bias has 
replaced the desire for truth, with the result that there is found 
among all classes a decided tendency to represent things not as 
they are but as people would have them be. The time-honoured 
and sound principle of historical thought, to subordinate the 
immediate to the remote cause, is at present generally rejected, 
and people hasten to fix the responsibility for war on the strength 
of the conflicting reports that have reached them since the out-
break of the struggle. Instead of judging current events in the 
penetrating light of the historical past, the public views them in 
the flickering gleam of a confused present. 
Nor do people stop here. They even attempt to reconstruct 
the past so as to have it conform to their biased notions of the 
present. They adopt current reports in all their unreliability as 
a standard of judgment even in regard to those matters that have 
been firmly established by impartial historical investigation. 
Even such permanent elements as national characteristics are 
ascribed to one people or another on the basis of current reports. 
Is it not utter folly, for example, to assert that Russia is the 
champion of liberty and the protector of weak states, just because 
she has issued a proclamation of autonomy to the Poles and 
happens to be fighting on the side of Belgium? And is it not 
250 
Published in THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY  2:3 (April 1915), pp. 250-263. 
Published by G.P. Putnam’s Sons & the University of Nebraska.
GERMAN VERSUS ENGLISH AGGRESSION 251 
equally absurd to call England the guardian of the rights of 
nationality because she professes to have entered the conflict on 
the part of a weak neighbour? Are we no longer able to dis-
tinguish between occasion and cause, between incidentals and 
fundamentals? 
By such indiscriminate and reckless bestowal of praise upon 
the one party pnblic opinion lays itself open to the suspicion 
that its vehement accusations against the other rest upon an 
equally insecure foundation. At all events, the excited state of 
the public mind makes an investigation into the charges pre-
ferred against Germany, chief among which is that of aggression, 
most timely. 
If we indulge in a little reasoning of the kind that was in 
vogue before the war, we shall agree, I think, that such a fault as 
aggressiveness cannot be regarded as a mere spasmodic impulse 
by which a great nation would allow itself to be plunged into a 
hazardous conflict but must rather be viewed as an inherent 
national characteristic. And when we bear in mind that the 
lives of peoples are not measured by years but by decades and 
centuries, we naturally expect such a trait as aggressiveness to 
manifest itself repeatedly in the life of a nation. To determine 
Germany's aggressive spirit, therefore, we may ignore what 
people say or think of her present course of action and be gnided 
solely by her past as established before the impartial tribunal of 
history. And since it is becoming more and more clear, even 
to the less discerning, that the issue in this tremendous struggle 
is a trial of strength between Germany and England, and more-
over since the English are the people who first attributed this 
incriminating trait to the Germans, it seems but reasonable to 
compare England's acts of aggression in her past with those of 
Germany during the same period. 
In discussing the aggression of a nation, however, we must 
be careful not to confuse the internal affairs that made for con-
solidation with those acts that were encroachments upon the 
integrity or independence of foreign peoples. Every united 
country which has emerged from the remote past has its own 
history of consolidation, in which one tribe assumed the leader-
ship and encroached upon the presumable rights of its brother 
tribes. Without such aggression on the part of one state the 
unification of a whole people would have been impossible; and 
what we have called aggression in this case is in reality nothing 
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but a rapprochement between the various factions and subdivi-
sions of a homogeneous people. The expansion of Prussia under 
Bismarck which brought about the unification of Germany can 
not therefore be called aggression, certainly not more so than 
the acts of certain portions of the English people which created 
a united England or the activities of the Capetians which 
led to the unity of France. If Prussia is condemned, as she has 
been in certain quarters, for coercing the smaller German states 
to help her found the Empire, then the Northern States were 
likewise at fanlt in taking up arms against the South to preserve 
the American Union. 
Further, to understand the nature of aggression more fully we 
must not only exclude the internal affairs of a nation but also 
distinguish between the annexation of regions inhabited by 
savage tribes and the seizure of lands occupied by organized states 
representing a modern or an ancient civilization. In the former 
case the aggressor lays claim to what he has seized by the so-
called right of discovery or exploration; in the latter his acts 
must be designated by the more opprobrious term of conquest. 
In the light of these distinctions let us now consider English 
and German expansion during the period prior to the formation 
of the German Empire, and secondly from 1870 to the outbreak 
of the present war. It is common knowledge that the earlier 
acqnisitions of England are scattered over all parts of the globe. 
No other modern nation has been either so enterprising or so 
successful in colonization. To provide room for the surplus or 
the discontented elements of her population England as early 
as the seventeenth century established colonies in North America. 
Other territories occupied by England in the same manner are 
Australia and New Zealand. All these portions of her extensive 
empire Great Britain accordingly holds by the legitimate right 
of colonization. In none of these places has she violated any 
civilized man's rights. But such acquisitions constitute only a 
minor part of Great Britain's vast over-sea possessions. A 'far 
greater portion of her empire has been obtained by encroaching 
upon the rights of other peoples. From France she took the 
greater part of Canada, territory which had been discovered, 
explored, and settled by the French and to which they had a more 
inherent right than they ever had to Alsace or Lorraine. From 
Spain she captured Gibraltar, while from Denmark she wrested 
Helgoland, at the same time destroying the fleet of this kingdom 
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in an action which for treachery is, perhaps, without a parallel 
in the annals of modern history. In seizing Hong Kong from 
China England extended her conquests to the Far East and 
thereby paved the way for future encroachments in this corner 
of the globe. While there stands as the climax to this series of 
aggressions the subjugation of India, in which the conqueror 
not only violated the territorial integrity but completely de-
stroyed the independence of a nation possessed of an ancient 
civilization. The question whether the civilization of India was 
not inferior to that of England is here quite impertinent. 
The only incident in German history in any way comparable 
to England's conquest of India is Prussia's incorporation of a 
part of Poland. Although this conquest was partly thrust upon 
the Germanic power by the aggressive initiative of Russia and is 
to a certain degree excusable on the plea that Poland with its 
quite impossible internal conditions was, as a next-door neigh-
bour, a constant source of menace to the security of the Prussian 
state, we shall not endeavour to extenuate the destruction of the 
integrity and the independence of Poland by calling it anything 
more palliating than an act of outright aggression. The other 
German acquisitions of territory before the founding of the Em-
pire were Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine. In both of 
these instances the causes and circumstances leading up to the 
annexation were, however, quite different from those which 
obtained in the case of Poland. 
The Schleswig-Holstein question was one of the most involved 
in the history of European diplomacy. Lord Palmerston once 
said that only three persons had ever understood it; one was dead, 
one crazy, and he himself, the third, had forgotten what it was 
all about. Fortunately for us the intricate details of this question 
do not concern us here. To determine the degree of Germany's 
aggression we need understand only the main issues. They 
are comparatively simple, although they take us back as far as 
the tenth century. In the Middle Ages Schleswig was a fief 
of Denmark, while the duchy of Holstein owed allegiance to the 
Holy Roman Empire. During the tenth and eleventh centuries 
the greater part of Schleswig was populated by Germans and soon 
formed a close union with Holstein. In 1460 the two provinces 
elected the Danish ruler-not as their king, however, but merely 
as their overlord. In return the Danish ruler had to grant a 
charter of privileges, in which he solemnly promised that the two 
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provinces should remain united for all time and never be incorpo-
rated in the Danish monarchy. Every new ruler in Denmark on 
ascending the throne reconfirmed the special privileges of the two 
duchies, and for centuries this purely personal relationship be-
tween the rulers of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein continued 
in force. The distinctive character of Holstein was moreover 
emphasized by the fact that this duchy was one of the Confedera-
tion of German States and the Danish king in his capacity as 
Dnke of Holstein a member of the German Diet. As such his 
rights in the provinces were naturally more limited than in his 
own kingdom. Although nominally commander-in-chief of the 
Schleswig-Holstein forces he did not possess the right to command 
these troops without the consent of the estates of the two duchies. 
The army of Schleswig-Holstein was quite distinct from that of 
Denmark, having not only separate regiments but also its own 
national colours. The same distinctive character of the provinces 
is also seen in the rights of their estates to refuse taxes to the 
Danish government. Then, again, a different law of succession 
obtained in Schleswig-Holstein from that in the kingdom proper. 
Whereas succession in both the male and the female line was in 
force in Denmark, the two provinces in accordance with the old 
German Salic law recognized succession only in the male line. 
Over against this loose connection with Denmark the duchies 
had ever since 1460 maintained a most close and intimate union 
with each other. Not only did they have a common army, 
common executive officials, common courts ; but all state establish-
ments, such as the University of Kiel, and all penal and philan-
thropic institutions were owned and controlled conjointly. And 
although the changes of centuries had affected, in some respects, 
the relation between the provinces and Denmark, the two funda-
mental rights of Schleswig-Holstein, that they should remain one 
and inseparable and should never be incorporated in the Danish 
monarchy, were never tampered with by the Danish crown. 
Schleswig and Holstein were accordingly, to all intents and pur-
poses, independent provinces under the suzerainty of Denmark. 
The first attempt to change the political status of Schleswig-
Holstein was made in 1807, when the Holy Roman Empire, of 
which Holstein was a member, had come to an end. Denmark 
regarded this as the opportune moment to incorporate both 
provinces; but this attempt to encroach on their autonomy was 
resisted by the Schleswig-Holsteiners with so much determination 
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that it was doomed to failure. This Danish scheme of aggran-
dizement, however, was revived in 1849, when under the impulse of 
constitutional government a strong party, the so-called Eider 
Danes, was formed with the avowed purpose of incorporating at 
least the province of Schleswig in the Danish monarchy. That 
the ambition of the Eider Danes did not embrace Holstein as well 
is explained by the fact that this province had in 1815 become a 
member of the German Confederation. When it became clear 
to the duchies that Denmark was bent on tearing Schleswig from 
Holstein and making it an incorporate part of the Danish state, 
they forthwith took up arms to defend their liberty. This war 
resulted in the intervention of the powers and the Conference of 
London. In the London Protocol, drawn up by this conference, 
the ancient right of the two provinces to remain inseparable was 
again reiterated, and it was further stipulated that the relation 
between the duchies and Denmark could not be changed unless 
by common consent, the status quo being thus guaranteed for 
the future. In spite of this international agreement the Eider 
Danes continued their agitation for a greater Denmark and in 
1855 went so far as to promulgate a new constitution for both the 
kingdom and the duchies, without the consent of the latter. 
When the German Confederation protested on behalf of Holstein, 
the Danes declared that they would annul the constitution for 
Holstein but retain it for Schleswig. This meant of course incor-
poration of the latter province and was a flagrant violation of 
the rights of the duchies as they had existed since 1460 and had 
been confirmed time and again by Denmark herself and only 
recently by all the Great Powers. The provinces now appealed 
to Germany for assistance, and the well-known result was their 
complete separation from the kingdom of Denmark. The 
Eider Danes, thanks to their aggressive attempts to change the 
right of suzerainty to that of complete sovereignty, destroyed 
even that loose personal relation which had existed for centuries 
between Schleswig-Holstein and the Danish kingdom. 
But if the political phase of the Schleswig-Holstein question 
seems favourable to the German side, its racial aspect is even 
more so. The most important point to remember in this connec-
tion is that Holstein had from time immemorial been German, 
and that fully two-thirds of the population of Schleswig were also 
German, so that over 85 per cent. of the two provinces considered 
as a unit were of German stock. Only that part of Schleswig 
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which borders on Denmark was inhabited by a mixed population, 
the Germans living in the cities and the Danes occupying the 
country districts. In these districts the Danes used the Danish 
language in church and school, but employed German in commer-
ciallife and in official court proceedings. In Holstein and in the 
greater part of Schleswig the people read only German news-
papers, and from all parts of both provinces the young people 
flocked to the German University of Kie1 for their higher educa-
tion. In his national characteristics the Schleswig-Holsteiner 
also differed from the Dane and had a national consciousness 
quite his own. And this feeling that the inhabitants of the 
duchies had a distinct nationality was fully shared by the Danes 
of the kingdom, who regarded their German neighbours of the 
two provinces as phlegmatic, awkward, narrow-minded, pedantic 
beings, who were destined to be governed by a superior race and 
owed their independence entirely to lack of aggressiveness on the 
part of Denmark. 
With such sentiments as these towards the inhabitants of 
Schleswig-Holstein it is not surprising that during the awaken-
ing of Danish national aspirations a reign of oppression and 
tyranny should have been instituted in the provinces with the 
object of making Danes of recalcitrant Germans. The freedom of 
the press, which was safeguarded by the constitution in Denmark, 
was abolished in the German duchies and political meetings of 
any kind prohibited; not even gatherings of three persons for 
the purpose of petitioning the king were permitted. Every-
where German officials were removed and Danes appointed in 
their place and in the districts of a mixed population German 
teachers and divines were banished. In spite of such oppressive 
measures the powerful states of the German Confederation re-
frained for fully ten years from intervention. In view of all 
these facts it would seem as though the real aggressor was not 
Germany against Denmark but Denmark against the two weak 
German provinces. 
The Alsace-Lorraine problem, like that of Schleswig-Hol-
stein, must likewise be examined in the light of the past. To 
determine the degree of aggression of the two nations involved 
it is by no means sufficient merely to state that the two provinces 
had belonged to France before 1870 and were then conquered 
by Germany. The problem arose no more through Germany's 
annexation of the provinces than it seems to be settled thereby 
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in our own day; just like any similar case, it must be judged in 
the light of its origin and development during centuries. 
Originally, centuries before either modern Germany or France 
came into existence, the country along the Rhine known as 
Alsace and Lorraine was settled by Germans and later formed a 
part of Charlemagne's empire. When at the death of Louis the 
Pious this empire was divided among his three sons, the boundary 
line between France and Germany was established for the first 
time. This line extended almost due north and south some 
distance west of Verdun so that this city as well as Metz and Toul 
belonged to Germany. By the treaty of 887 this line of demarca-
tion was again confirmed and continued to form the boundary 
between France and Germany for more than seven hundred years. 
In the fourteenth century French ambitions were directed toward 
Lorraine, though no serious attempts at conquest were made 
until 1552, when Henry II seized the cities of Verdun, Toul, and 
Metz. Later, during the Thirty Years' War, when the various 
German states were arrayed against each other in civil strife, 
French armies began to overrun German territory west of the 
Rhine. Many cities were occupied, some by force of arms, others 
through negotiations with the Catholic bishops and counts, who 
ceded some of their territory to France, a Catholic power, to 
prevent its falling into the hands of the Swedes or other Protes-
tants. At the close of the Thirty Years' War France retained a 
part of Alsace, asserting that she had conquered it from the 
Emperor, although this province did not belong to him at the 
time but to a side line of the House of Hapsburg. In the treaty 
of Westphalia the clauses relating to the new French conquest 
were so indefinite and ambiguous that France at the time took 
possession of only a small portion of what she claimed on the 
basis of this same treaty thirty years later. Only when Germany 
was involved in a new war against the Turks and was thus unable 
to resist an invasion from the west did France dare to place her 
own construction on the treaty of Westphalia and begin to conquer 
the whole of Alsace and Lorraine. Louis XIV in a ruthless 
manner now seized the ten free imperial cities west of the Rhine, 
chief of them Strassburg, and incorporated them in his monarchy 
despite the protest of the inhabitants and the Empire. Germany 
was so exhausted by her campaigns that in the peace of Ryswick 
she was compelled to cede Alsace and Lorraine and the ten free 
cities to the conqueror. At the end of the seventeenth century 
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Alsace and Lorraine had accordingly through conquest become 
a part of France; and this political status continued till 1870, when 
after a campaign unparalleled in its successes Germany decided 
to take back, as the prize of victory, the two provinces, which in 
her days of weakness had been wrested from her. 
This brief survey of the history of Alsace-Lorraine is sufficient 
to show how mistaken those people are who imply that the two 
provinces were territory to which France had originally an 
inherent right. But even if in spite of historical facts we should 
concede that France had as much right to these provinces as 
Germany, the balance of race in this case, as in that of Schleswig-
Holstein, is preponderantly on the side of Germany. 
As was stated before, the Germans settled in Alsace-Lorraine 
as early as the fourth century of the Christian era. After the 
division of the Frankish empire Alsace was held by the dukes of 
Swabia and later by the Hapsburgs. A number of free cities 
sprang up, and the two provinces participated as fully in the 
intellectual and spiritual life of the German people as any other 
part of the Empire. After the French conquest systematic 
attempts were made to assimilate the inhabitants to the French, 
but without success. The people of both provinces clung tena-
ciously to their German language and to the traditions of their 
Teutonic forefathers. How deeply the life of the people con-
tinued to be imbued with German ideals is illustrated by the fact 
that a hundred years after their conquest Herder and Goethe 
could collect the choicest treasures of German Volkslieder among 
the Alsatians. Not until the time of the French Revolution, 
when French and Germans were more closely drawn together by 
the common ideal of democracy, did the French spirit penetrate 
even the higher classes. 
But the defenders of France usually condone her seizure of 
these German provinces by a reference to the spirit of the times. 
It is true, they tell us, that the original fault lay with France; she 
conquered German territory and incorporated it in her kingdom, 
but this happened at a time when the feeling of nationality was 
not so strongly developed as it was when Germany reclaimed 
these provinces. Viewed from the political standpoint this is 
undoubtedly true. When France conquered Alsace-Lorraine the 
integrity of large states and the political status of small states 
were much less secure than in 1870. Border provinces of larger 
states were frequently exchanged as though they were mere 
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chattels of barter. Furthermore, it must be remembered that 
the German Empire was at that time a mere confederation of 
states, and accordingly a much looser union than France was 
two hundred years later. But if these considerations help us to 
extenuate France's aggression, they can hardly justify it. How-
ever one may look at it, the fact remains that France in annexing 
Alsace and Lorraine obtained possession of two German provinces 
by aggression and conquest, and that she is therefore responsible 
for originating one of the most difficult problems of European 
politics. A point that we are apt to lose sight of when consider-
ing that the political connexion of these provinces was less 
close when France seized them than their union with France in 
1870, is that the spiritual ties such as language and tradition 
were originally much more intimate between Alsace-Lorraine 
and the remainder of Germany than they were later on between 
these provinces and France. People generally forget that the 
separation from Germany in the seventeenth century was felt 
more keenly by the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine than their 
separation from France in the nineteenth century. It seems but 
little known that for a hundred years after the conquest the 
conquerors failed completely to win this German people over to 
French ideals. Do those who condemn Germany by pointing 
to the French sympathies of the modern Alsatians know that their 
forefathers were for a hundred years even more bitter against 
France? And if Germany has as yet not fully succeeded in 
conciliating the provinces, who knows but what they will be 
more completely in sympathy with German ideals seventy 
years after their return to the original possessors than they 
were with Gallic ideals during their two centuries of French 
rule? And this would be quite natural, for fully eighty per 
cent. of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are and always have 
been of German stock. They speak the German language as 
their mother tongue; only twenty per cent. speak French or a 
patois of French. 
The history of Schleswig-Holstein and of Alsace-Lorraine 
in its political and racial aspects is sufficient to show that in 
annexing these provinces Germany cannot be accused of unjust 
aggression. She merely took back what had been unjustly 
wrested from her in the days of her weakness. Had Germany 
been united and able to defend what was hers, neither Denmark 
nor France would have dared to encroach upon her territory, and 
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there would never have been either a Schleswig-Holstein or an 
Alsace-Lorraine question. 
There are, perhaps, but few defenders of English policy who 
would not admit that England has been aggressive in the past-
much more so, if anything, than her present enemy. England's 
aggressiveness is, however, generally palliated by the name of 
opportunism and her conquests, as well as those of France, 
extenuated by a reference to the spirit of the times in which they 
were perpetrated. England and France, we are told, aggressed 
when modern civilization was still in its boyhood; they, as it 
were, sowed their wild oats when modem civilization was in its 
youth, and that is why the world is overlooking their sins. Con-
quests, we are reminded, formerly belonged to the established 
order of things, which England with the rest of the world has 
happily outgrown. Only Germany, we are assured, preaches 
barbaric principles and puts them into practice in our enlightened 
age. And so Germany's sins, though they may be far less than 
those of either England or France, become far greater by virtue 
of the higher moral standard of the world now prevailing. 
But is it really true that the leopard has changed his spots? 
Has England actually experienced the change of heart ascribed 
to her by her friends? Is she now actuated only by the highest 
sentiments of international justice? Does she stand ever ready 
to defend the independence of weaker states, even when her 
own interests are not involved? And what on the other hand are 
the recent aggressive acts of Germany which are so discreditable 
to her when viewed in the light of our own times? To answer 
these questions we must compare the expansion of the two 
countries in our own day since the founding of the German Empire 
to the outbreak of the present war. Why we should not include 
the present war also has been explained before. Only after 
matters have been cleared up by the historian, shall we be able 
to determine in how far one nation or the other was the real 
aggressor. 
Since the only lands remaining to be occupied by civilized 
nations in 1875 were the islands of the Pacific and the African 
continent, we must tum to those parts of the world. On the 
African continent England in 1875 possessed only 250,000 square 
miles. At present her Mrican possessions comprise 3,700,000 
square miles. During the last forty years England has accord-
ingly taken possession of 3,450,000 square miles of territory in 
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Africa alone. Add to this her recent acquisitions of 112,000 
square miles in Oceania and New Guinea, and you have a total 
of 3,562,000 square miles. With these figures let us compare 
the German acquisitions in Africa, Oceania, and New Guinea, 
and we have respectively 910,150 square miles, 24,200, and 
70,843, or a total of 1,005,193 square miles. Is it not strange 
that the country which is denounced as the most unscrupulous 
aggressor of our day should have seized not even one-third as 
much territory as England during the period when the latter is 
lauded for its unselfishness? The disproportion becomes even 
much greater when we consider that England's new acquisitions 
are of vastly superior commercial value on account of their 
superior natural resources and more favourable climatic condi-
tions and their infinitely greater strategic importance. 
Figures like the above become even more significant when 
we consider the motives by which the two nations were actuated 
in their new acquisitions. When in 1871 Germany took her place 
among the nations as a new world power, she found that the 
choice lands of the world were claimed by others. Russia, whose 
home territory comprises half of Europe, possessed also half of 
the Asiatic continent. France had her colonies in northern 
Africa, and Great Britain could boast that the sun never set upon 
her empire. Even the smaller nations, like Holland, Portugal, 
and Belgium, had their colonial domains. All these nations and 
especially England had territory enough and to spare, Germany 
alone was in bitter need of new lands. Confronted as she was 
by the problem of an evergrowing population with not a square 
foot of outside territory, her longing for new lands was natural, 
pathetic, almost tragic. Her desire for expansion was dictated 
by grim necessity. Yet in spite of this national exigency Ger-
many took merely what had been discarded by others and thus 
by her African and insular acquisitions did not infringe upon the 
rights of any other power. This fact explains why Germany of 
all the Great Powers was the only one that did not wage a war of 
aggression. France, in spite of her stationary population, has 
indulged in "peaceful penetration" of Morocco. Russia, which 
owned half of Europe and Asia, could not resist the Drang nach 
Osten and clashed with Japan. And peaceful England, which 
possessed millions of square miles of the richest land that was 
still waiting to be inhabited, did not hesitate to make war upon 
the Boer Republics and upon Egypt. In each of these cases the 
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present allies attacked weaker states. All these wars must 
accordingly be rated as wars of aggression. Only Germany, 
which was in bitter need of new territory, kept the peace although 
her offensive strength was admittedly as great as, if not greater 
than, that of any of her rivals. 
From whatever angle we regard the records of expansion in 
Africa, they result greatly in Germany's favour. Great Britain's 
acts on the continent of Africa have been immeasurably more 
aggressive than those of her rival. But what of the acts of the 
two nations in China? No nation has ever been more denounced, 
especially by England, than Germany for the seizure of Kiao-
Chau. The seizure of Kiao-Chau was no doubt an act of aggres-
sion, and Germany's reputation for fair play has suffered mucI"-
through her conduct in China. But is it not strange that whereas 
we criticize Germany so severely for Kiao-Chau, most of us do not 
seem even to know of the British seizure ofWei-Hai-Wei, although 
England holds this territory under like conditions to those under 
which Germany held Kiao-Chau, and its occupation is in every 
regard as much an encroachment upon the integrity of China. 
In view of England's professions of unselfishness and her 
denunciations of Germany's aggressiveness in our day, it is fairly 
startling to find that Great Britain has annexed fully three and 
a half times as much territory during the last forty years and has 
in general employed far more high-handedmethodsthanGermany~ 
While as though determined not to be outdone by any other 
power, England brought her record quite up to date when only 
three years ago she ousted the American financier from Persia 
and to all intents and purposes established a protectorate over 
that country, an act which, if we may judge by precedent, will 
soon be followed by complete annexation. 
But all this aggression on the part of England is in keeping 
with her time-honoured international policy. As history indi-
cates, a double relationship is the guide of her statesmen-balance 
of power and supremacy. The former is insisted on as her guid-
ing principle among the other powers, the latter is claimed as the 
innate right of Great Britain herself. There must be bala1'1..e 
of power on land, that is the imperative demand of internation~ 
fairness and justice; yet England must be mistress of the seas! 
But if there is to be balance of power, why not make it pertain 
equally to all, both on land and sea? How can anyone profess 
to be guided by the sense of fairness when laying down rules of 
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conduct for others which he refuses to obey himself? To one 
looking a little more closely, it is quite clear that Great Britain's 
one and only aim in her foreign policy is the preponderance of 
Great Britain. To England the balance of power is not an end 
in itself but merely the means to perpetuate her own supremacy. 
The history of international diplomacy for the last four hundred 
years demonstrates that England is satisfied to dwell not as one 
among equals but only as a superior among inferiors. That is 
why during the last three hundred years England's hostility was 
directed necessarily towards Spain, Holland, France, and Ger-
many; that is, invariably towards that nation which at the time 
was next to her in power and hence most likely to threaten her 
supremacy. 
Our examination of the remoter and immediate past proves 
one point beyond doubt: that the accusation of aggression against 
Germany can not be based on historical facts. This truth is 
also borne out inferentially by all newspaper and magazine 
articles written against Germany since the beginning of the 
present war. In nine cases out of ten, statements derogatory to 
the Germans are based on speeches of the Emperor, some of 
which he never made; on his alleged belief in the divine right of 
kings; or on doctrines of her philosophers, such as Nietzsche; or 
on the teachings of her professors, like Treitschke; and above all 
on the sayings and writings of German jingoes, such as Bern-
hardi, whose book is devoured by the wholesale in England and 
America while it is practically unknown in Germany. In lieu 
of facts people base their assertions on mere theories. In short, 
the accusations against Germany are founded almost exclusively 
on what people regard to be her doctrine of life. Germany is 
condemned to-day not for what she has done or is doing but for 
what people consider to be her intentions. Germany, accord-
ingly, finds herself in the position of the heretic in the Middle 
Ages, who was persecuted not for his immoral deeds but for his 
distasteful ideas. 
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